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The welfare loss of using a single discount rate is equivalent to a permanent reduction in
consumption that lies somewhere between 15% and 45%, depending upon which familiar
discounting system is used. Economists should devote more energy to support a reform of
public discounting systems in favor of what has been advocated by the normative interpretation
of modern asset pricing theories over the last four decades.
Keywords: Discounting, Investment Theory, Asset Pricing, Carbon Pricing, Arrow-Lind Theorem,
WACC Fallacy, Rare Disasters, Capital Budgeting
JEL Classification: G12, H43, Q5
The research leading to this paper has received indirect funding from Engie, EDF, Total,
SCOR through
TSE research contracts, and from the Chair "Sustainable Finance and Responsible
Investments" at TSE. It
has also been funded by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under grants ANR-17CE03-0010 – LONGTERMISM and ANR-17-EURE-0010 (Investissements d’Avenir
program).

Address for correspondence:
Christian Gollier
University of Toulouse-Capitole
Toulouse School of Economics
21 Allée de Brienne
31000 Toulouse
France
E-mail: christian.gollier@tse-fr.eu

The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it

https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1322

2

Gollier: The Welfare Cost of Ignoring the Beta

The welfare cost of ignoring the beta∗
Christian Gollier
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse-Capitole
January 16, 2021

Abstract
Because of risk aversion, any sensible investment valuation system should value less
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market failures), most public and private institutions and people use a discount rate that
is rather insensitive to the risk profile of their investment projects. I show in this paper
that the economic consequences of the implied misallocation of capital are dire. To do
this, I calibrate a Lucas model in which the investment opportunity set contains a myriad of projects with different expected returns and risk profiles. The welfare loss of using
a single discount rate is equivalent to a permanent reduction in consumption that lies
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1

Introduction

It is an enduring common practice in most western countries to value public investments and
policies by measuring the present value of their flow of expected social benefits using a single
discount rate. This means for example that no insurance or hedging value is recognized to
policies that reduce ex ante the consequences of natural catastrophes or of a pandemic for
example. Symmetrically, no penalty is imposed to policies involving benefits materializing
mostly in good states of nature, such as expanding the capacity of energy and transportation
infrastructures. It is never too late to change this inefficient practice. In this paper, I estimate
its social cost. It is large.
An obvious candidate to evaluate the impact of an investment on the risk borne by its
stakeholders is its "consumption beta", hereafter called beta. The beta of a project is defined
as the elasticity of its future benefit to changes in future aggregate consumption. The larger
the project’s beta, the larger its impact on the aggregate risk in the economy. Any decision criterion that recognizes risk aversion should value less projects with a larger beta, everything
else unchanged. Modern asset pricing and investment theories translated this simple idea
into practice by recommending that discount rates be adjusted for the projects’ beta. The
Consumption-based Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM) pioneered by Rubinstein (1976),
Lucas (1978) and Breeden (1979), and its extensions (Bansal and Yaron (2004), Barro (2006))
to solve the asset pricing puzzles (Mehra and Prescott (1985), Weil (1989)), provide a normative framework to justify this methodology. In these models, there is a linear relationship
between the socially desirable discount rate for a project and its consumption beta. This
discounting system is thus characterized by two key variables: the risk-free discount rate and
the aggregate risk premium. The risk-free discount rate describes our willingness to care
about the future in general, whereas the risk premium characterizes our collective distaste
for acts that raises the aggregate risk. The large market risk premium relative to the riskfree market rate observed over the last century suggests that the risk-adjustment embedded
in this efficient discounting system should play a crucial role in the investment evaluation
process.
The practice of investment evaluation and selection is often distant from these recommendations universally supported by normative economic theory. This is particularly true
for the discounted expected utility model that supports the CCAPM and which has strong
normative appeals. In the public sector, most countries and international organizations have
established guidelines for policy and investment evaluation in which the recommended discount rate is unique and not sensitive to the risk profile of the decision under scrutiny.1 This
dogma of a single discount rate for the public sector has long been supported by the influential
Arrow-Lind theorem (Arrow and Lind (1970)), which claims that "the government invests in
a greater number of diverse projects and is able to pool risks to a much greater extent than
private investors", thereby washing out risk completely. Most people interpreted this result
as meaning that all public investment projects should be discounted at the risk-free interest
rate. But, as stated by Sandmo (1972), Lucas (2014), Baumstark and Gollier (2014) and
the CCAPM theory, this result is valid only for projects with a zero CCAPM beta. Notice
that Arrow and Lind mentioned this point in their paper: "The results ... depend on returns
1

See Section 2 for more details on this. France is the only exception, but its CCAPM public discounting
system is under the pressure to go back in line with the international norm of a single rate, with the argument
that France cannot be right alone.
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from a public investment being independent of other components of national income" (p.
373). As stressed by Bazelon and Smetters (1999) and Cherbonnier and Gollier (2019), the
use of a single discount rate tends to overvalue positive-beta policies such as building new
transportation infrastructures, and to undervalue policies that hedge the macroeconomic risk
such as improving earthquake-resistant construction norms, increasing pandemic-treatment
capacities, or building a strategic petroleum reserve. Because a vast majority of projects have
a positive beta, the use of the risk-free rate as the discount rate implies an excess of positive
NPV projects compared to the capacity of public funding, thereby often forcing governments
to impose a capital rationing scheme on top of the valuation process. The Arrow-Lind fallacy
also prevailed in the debate about public spending in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008
or of the COVID-19 crisis of 2020 when many experts recommended using the low cost of
public capital to implement ambitious recovery plans in the United States and in Europe.2
The absence of consensus on the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) in our profession illustrates the mess in which economists and practitioners have to survive under this inefficient
discounting system. In climate economics since the publication of the Stern Review (Stern
(2007)), most proponents to the debate used the Ramsey rule (Ramsey (1928)) to evaluate
the rate at which future climate damages should be discounted.3 The problem is that the
Ramsey rule and its extension to uncertainty (Hansen and Singleton (1983)) characterize the
rate at which safe benefits should be discounted. Weitzman (2001) made things more confusing by suggesting that when the long-term risk-free rate is uncertain, its harmonic mean
should be used to discount long-term climate damages. The first reference to the necessity
to adjust the climate discount rate to the risk profile of the climate damages emerged when
the Obama administration convened a commission aimed at making recommendation on the
SCC. The Technical Support Document (TSD, Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of
Carbon (2010)) used three discount rates: 2.5%, 3% and 5%, this latter rate reflecting "the
possibility that climate damages are positively correlated with market returns." Dietz et al.
(2018) showed that in the DICE model of Nordhaus (2008), the CCAPM beta of climate
damages is close to unity: In the business-as-usual scenario, future climate damages will be
larger if the future will be more prosperous. This implies that the entire debate on the SCC
has long been misleading by ignoring the crucial risk-adjustment of the climate discount risk.
Inefficient discount systems generate a myriad of other issues. For example, at which price
should governments sell specific infrastructures, such as highways, railroads, or hospitals?
What is the value of public investments in defense, schools, or research institutions? How
should public funds from covid recovery funds and green deals be allocated? How should
students value their different educational options? All these questions are certain to receive
bad answers when using an inefficient discounting system, in particular when contemplating
long-lasting investments.
Whether the private sector uses more efficient investment decision rules remains an open
question. On one side, standard textbooks in finance strongly recommend the CCAPM rule
to evaluate investment projects, and most CFOs claim to use it. On the other side, there is
2

See for example Paul Krugman’s op-ed in the NYT entitled "Ideology and investment" (October 26, 2014):
"The federal government can borrow incredibly cheaply... So borrowing to build roads, repair sewers and more
seems like a no-brainer." Although a reduction in the interest rate implies a uniform reduction in risk-adjusted
discount rate, it does not mean that the public cost of capital should be used to uniformly discount all public
projects. Boyer (2018) provides other illustrations of this fallacy in the public sector.
3
See for example Arrow (2007), Nordhaus (2007), Dasgupta (2008) and Weitzman (2010).
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ample evidence in observed asset prices that the CCAPM pricing rule is only partially able
to explain them. The Security Market Line – which links expected returns to betas – is too
flat. I go in more details on this issue in the next section.
The bottom line is that the practice of capital budgeting and investment evaluation is
still far from what would be compatible with social welfare maximization. In this paper, I
measure the welfare loss associated with using a single discount rate when performing the
benefit-cost analysis to determine the optimal allocation of capital in the economy. Contrary
to the standard endowment economy that is used in the CCAPM (Lucas (1978), Martin
(2013)), I examine a dynamic model in which investments are endogenously selected in an
opportunity set with heterogeneous risk profiles and expected benefits. At the beginning of
each period, identical infinitely-lived agents must determine what share of their wealth should
be consumed, and which investments should be implemented. The first-best investment rule
entails a CCAPM discounting system in which the project-specific discount rate is a linear
function of the project’s beta. I calibrate this model by assuming that the common risk
factor is affected by extreme events as in Barro (2006) in order to solve the standard asset
pricing puzzles. I then compare this dynamic equilibrium to another equilibrium in which the
representative agent uses a single discount rate to determine her investment strategy. I show
that the absence of risk-adjustment in this procedure has catastrophic effects on intertemporal
welfare. This is a reminder of the importance of the allocation of capital in our economy for
its functioning and for our collective prosperity.

2
2.1

Discounting in practice
The public sector

France is currently the only country in the world in which public investment projects must be
evaluated using a discount rate that is sensitive to the project’s risk profile (Quinet (2013)).
The French discounting system is based on the CCAPM with a risk-free discount rate of
2.5% and a systematic risk premium of 2%.4 The evaluators are thus required to estimate
the consumption beta of their project, which is defined as the elasticity of the project’s net
benefit to changes in aggregate consumption. Personnal anecdotes suggest that lobbies from
high-beta sectors have periodically attempted to go back to a single discount rate, or to
reduce the level of the aggregate risk premium by referring to the equity premium puzzle.5
Between 1997 and 2012, Norway used a simplified version of the CCAPM to evaluate
large public investment projects, with project-specific discount rates ranging from 3.5% to
8% depending upon the project’s beta. But a report published in 2012 (Hagen et al. (2012))
claimed that "considerable room for discretionary assessments with regard to estimates as
to project-specific risk ... may offer incentives to choose assumptions that may influence the
outcome of the analysis in the direction favoured by various interest parties... These circumstances suggest that it may be preferable to recommend simple and transparent rules that
4
All discount rates discussed in this paper are real discount rates. I limite this description to short-term
discount rates. The French system also imposes a smaller risk-free discount rate and a larger risk premium
for long maturities.
5
A pernicious strategy yielding the same outcome consists in proposing to discount the certainty equivalent
benefits at the risk-free discount rate. This methodology is supported by the theory, but it fails to fit observed
investment decisions.
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capture the most important aspects of the matter, without being too complex to understand
or to apply" (page 77). Consequently, the report recommends the use of a single discount
rate of 4%. It has been determined by combining a risk-free rate of 2.5% and an average risk
premium of 1.5%.
More recently, the Netherlands has adopted three public discount rates (Rijksoverheid
(2020)): An all-purpose discount rate of 2.25%, with two exceptions. A lower discount rate
of 1.6% should be used for "costs that are largely or wholly independent of usage (i.e. fixed
costs)". A larger discount rate of 2.9% should be used for "benefits that are highly non-linear
relative to usage, where usage, moreover, depends on the state of the economy." This could
be interpreted as a simplified version of the CCAPM discounting system, with the partition
of the investment opportunity set into three beta segments.
All other countries that have published a discounting guideline have been using since a
long time – and are still using – a single discount rate. In the United Kingdom, the official
discount rate has been 3.5% since 2003, using the Ramsey rule (Treasury (2018)). In the
European Union, it is equal to 5.5% for the "Cohesion countries" (basically the more recent
member states) and 3.5% for the others (Florio (2008)). The most confusing discounting
system can be found in the United States. Since the publication of Circular A-4 by OMB
(2003), regulatory analysis should "provide estimates of net benefits using both 3 percent and
7 percent" discount rates. This official document justifies these two rates as respectively the
"real rate of return on long-term government debt" and the "average before-tax rate of return
to private capital in the U.S. economy". Nordhaus (2013) claims that in Circular A-4, "the
OMB discussion is completely confused... because the difference is not the difference between
investment and consumption" but instead "the risk premium on leveraged corporate capital"
(quoted by Sunstein (2014)). This confusion and the absence of guideline about which of these
two discount rates should be used in practice represents a procedural failure that has been
used by the Trump administration to arbitrarily increase the discount rate for carbon pricing
to 7 percent, yielding a carbon price of 1 USD/tCO2 (Environmental Protection Agency
(2018)), from around 50 USD/tCO2 at the end of the Obama administration (Interagency
Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (2015)).6

2.2

The private sector

The standard reference of project evaluation and capital budgeting for practitioners is the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). The CAPM remains a central reference taught in
most MBAs around the world. Classical finance textbooks such as Bodie and Merton (2000)
and Brealey et al. (2017) recommend the CAPM for investment evaluation. According to
Graham and Harvey (2001), 73.5% of the surveyed CFOs always or almost always used
the CAPM to evaluate investment projects. In a more recent survey conducted by the
Association for Financial Professionals, about 90% of the 300 respondents claimed to use the
CAPM to estimate the risk-adjusted discount rate to evaluate investment projects (Jacobs
and Shivdasani (2012)). Cohen et al. (2009) adopted the view point of a buy-and-hold investor
and showed that asset prices are closely related to the value of their cash flows discounted at
a CAPM risk-adjusted rate.
6

The other ingredient used by the Trump administration to reduce the social cost of carbon is the limitation
of the benefits to those accruing to U.S. citizens.
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The CAPM differs from the CCAPM by assuming that the representative agent holds
the equity market portfolio rather than a claim on aggregate consumption. Because that
eliminates a large class of assets, in particular human capital, the CAPM offers an imperfect
tool to measure the impact of investments on social welfare. Another well-known puzzle comes
from the observation that the CAPM does not fit the data of portfolio returns for relatively
short holding periods. The CAPM predicts a linear relationship between the expected return
of an asset and its beta. The slope of this Security Market Line (SML) is thus univocally
determined by the risk free rate and the expected return of the equity portfolio. But as
shown by Fama and French (1992) for short holding periods, the observed SML around the
market portfolio has a much smaller slope than predicted by this theory. This generates
a problem similar to the one observed in the public sector, with low-beta projects being
undervalued, and large-beta projects being overvalued. Dessaint et al. (2019) confirm this
finding by examining a large sample of mergers and acquisitions. They show that bids for
low-beta (large-beta) private targets entail lower (larger) bidder returns, thereby suggesting
that bidders use the CAPM to value their targets, whereas the market value them less by
using larger discount rates. They estimate an average mismatch in valuation between 12%
to 33% of the deal values.
Another standard misunderstanding in this field is what Krueger et al. (2015) have termed
the "WACC fallacy". It consists in using the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) of
an institution as the single discount rate used by this institution to evaluate its investment
opportunities. This method obviously violates the value-additivity principle of efficient asset
pricing illustrated by the Modigliani-Miller theorem. If the risk profiles of the institution’s
portfolio of investment opportunities are heterogeneous, this method will generate too many
investments in risky projects and too few investments in safe ones. It tends to ignore the
impact of investing in risky projects on the cost of capital to fund the other projects. In
a sense, this is the private sector version of the Arrow-Lind fallacy. Bierman (1993) found
that 93% of the Fortune 100 industrial firms used the WACC for discounting. Graham and
Harvey (2001) obtained a similar result, in which "58.8% of the respondents would always
or almost always use the company-wide discount rate, even though the hypothetical project
would most likely have different risk characteristics." This is confirmed by Brealey et al.
(2017) who had "to admit that many large companies use the company cost of capital not
just as a benchmark, but also as an all-purpose discount rate for every project proposal"
(p. 223). The best empirical demonstration of this fact has been provided by Krueger et al.
(2015) who showed that conglomerates underinvest in relatively safe divisions and overinvest
in riskier ones.
All this suggests that, compared to the public sector, the private sector has been more
prone to take account of risk for investment evaluation, but this effort has not been entirely
successful to these days.

3

The model

The model is an adaptation of the CCAPM in which the dynamics of heterogenous capital
allocation is endogenous. There is a single consumption good that can be either consumed
or invested. An investment project is characterized by a pair (θ, β) ∈ R2 , and the investment
opportunity set in the economy is described by a distribution function F over this pair. This
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distribution is stationary. For simplicity, capital is short-lived. One unit of capital invested
in project (θ, β) at date t − 1 generates a single benefit xt (θ, β) that materializes at date t,
with
xt (θ, β) = θ + βyt + ε̃t (θ, β),
(1)
with Et−1 ε̃t = 0. We assume that risks ε̃(θ, β) are idiosyncratic, in the sense that ε̃(θ, β) and
ε̃(θ0 , β 0 ) are statistically independent for all (θ, θ0 , β, β 0 ). The project-specific benefit xt (θ, β)
is sensitive to the realization of a common factor whose realization yt at date t is unknown
at date t − 1, with Et−1 yt = 0. We assume that (y0 , y1 , y2 , ...) is a vector of independent and
identically distributed random variables that are independent of the idiosyncratic risks ε̃. To
sum up, a project is characterized by its expected gross return on investment (ROI) θ and
by its sensitivity β to the common factor y. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
average β among all projects belonging to the investment opportunity set is equal to unity:
ZZ

βdF (θ, β) = 1.

(2)

The decision variable αt (θ, β) represents the capital invested in projects (θ, β) at date t.
If the investment strategy αt : R2 → R is chosen at date t, it generates total wealth zt+1 at
date t + 1, which is equal to
ZZ

zt+1 =

αt (θ, β)xt+1 (θ, β)dF (θ, β) = θt + β t yt+1 ,

with

(3)

ZZ

θt =
and

αt (θ, β)θdF (θ, β)

(4)

αt (θ, β)βdF (θ, β).

(5)

ZZ

βt =

Consumption at date t equals ct = zt − αt , where αt is total investment expenditure at date
t, with
ZZ
αt =

αt (θ, β)dF (θ, β)

(6)

I assume that the capital which can be invested at date t in any project (θ, β) in the economy
is constrained to be non-negative and smaller than zt /η, with η ∈ [0, 1]. So for example, in
the absence of consumption at date t, i.e., when zt = αt , a feasible investment strategy is
to implement a fraction η of the investment projects to full capital capacity, and to invest
nothing in the other projects. A capacity constraint is necessary in this model to discard an
investment strategy in which the entire capital of the economy would be invested in projects
with the best risk-return profile.
There is a continuum of infinitely-lived agents in the economy. They are endowed with the
same initial wealth and they all face the same opportunity set of investment projects. They
maximize the discounted expected utility of their flow of consumption. Their preferences
are characterized by their common utility discount factor δ and by their increasing and
concave utility function u over consumption. I assume a CRRA utility function with u(c) =
c1−γ /(1 − γ), with γ > 0. In the calibration section of this paper, I will solve the asset pricing
puzzles by assuming rare disasters in the distribution of y.
7
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4
4.1

The rational equilibrium
Characterization

A rational equilibrium is an allocation in which all agents follow the investment strategy
that maximizes their intertemporal welfare. Because all agents have the same preferences
and the same initial endowment, autarky is an equilibrium. I first characterize the optimal
investment strategy in this economy. It solves the following recursive problem:
V (zt ) =

max

αt :R2 →[0,zt /η]

u(zt − αt ) + δEV (θt + β t y).

(7)

The first-order condition for the investment decision in project (θ, β) can be written as follows:
For all (θ, β) such that dF (θ, β) > 0,
∗

h

∗

i

u0 (zt − α∗t ) = δE (θ + βy)V 0 (θt + β t y) + ψt (α, β)
with

(8)



 ≥0

if αt∗ (θ, β) = 0,
ψt (θ, β) = 0 if αt∗ (θ, β) ∈ ]0, zt /η[,

 ≤ 0 if α∗ (θ, β) = z /η.
t
t

(9)

I consider the following guess solution:
V ∗ (z) = h∗

z 1−γ
1−γ

(10)

Proposition 1 describes the solution of this problem, which is based on this guess solution.
It is easy to check that this solution satisfies the equilibrium conditions (7)-(9).
Proposition 1. If it exists, the rational equilibrium investment strategy αt∗ (θ, β) = α∗ (θ, β)zt /η
is such that


if θ ≤ R∗ + βπ ∗ ,
 =0
∗
(11)
α (θ, β) ∈ [0, 1] if θ = R∗ + βπ ∗ ,

 =1
∗
∗
if θ ≥ R + βπ ,
The risk-free rate R∗ and the aggregate risk premium π ∗ are defined respectively as
 ∗

R∗ =

∗

η 1−γ − δE θ + β y
 ∗

∗

1−γ

δ(η − α∗ )E θ + β y
and

 ∗

π∗ = −

∗

Ey θ + β y
 ∗

∗

E θ +β y
∗

−γ ,

(12)

−γ

−γ ,

∗

(13)
∗

∗

∗

∗

where the triplet (α∗ , θ , β ) ∈ R3 is such that α∗t = α∗ zt /η, θt = θ zt /η and β t = β zt /η.
The welfare measure h∗ at equilibrium equals
h∗ =

(η − α∗ )1−γ
 ∗

∗

η 1−γ − δE θ + β y

1−γ .

(14)
 ∗

∗

This rational equilibrium exists if and only if η 1−γ is larger than δE θ + β y

1−γ

.

8
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Function α∗ (θ, β) describes the optimal investment strategy. It equals 1, i.e., projects
(θ, β) are implemented at full capacity, if and only if their expected rate of return θ is larger
than the project-specific discount rate R∗ + βπ ∗ . Variable α∗ can thus be interpreted as the
proportion of projects in the investment opportunity set that are implemented. It implies a
constant consumption/wealth ratio equaling 1 − α∗ /η.
Along this optimal stationary investment strategy, the growth process follows a discrete
version of a brownian motion:
zt
zt−1

=

ct
ct−1

∗

=

∗

θ
β
+ yt .
η
η

(15)

In equation (1), we expressed the return of any project (θ, β) as a linear function of the
artificial common factor y. Using the above equation, we can rewrite this return as a linear
function of the growth rate of aggregate consumption:
∗!

xt (θ, β) =

θ
θ−β ∗
β

+β

η ct
+ ε̃t (θ, β).
∗
β ct−1

(16)

Notice that this equation is the classical CCAPM regression in which the return of a project
(θ, β) is regressed on the growth rate of consumption. It implies that the CCAPM beta of
this project is defined as follows:
β CCAP M (θ, β) = β

η
∗.
β

(17)

The optimal intertemporal welfare is measured by V ∗ (z0 ). Normalizing z0 to unity, it
can be more intuitively measured by the permanent equivalent consumption level cpe that
generates the same intertemporal utility, yielding
1

cpe∗ = ((1 − δ)h∗ ) 1−γ .

(18)

This variable is a convenient measure of optimal intertemporal welfare. A similar policy
evaluation instrument has been used by Epstein et al. (2014) in another context.

4.2

Calibration

The parameters of the benchmark calibration are summarized in Table 1. We assume a
constant relative risk aversion of γ = 3 and a utility discount factor of δ = 0.99. We also
assume that η = 2, which means that the entire wealth in the economy would be able to
finance 50% of all possible investment projects.
We assume that the mean payoff θ and the sensitivity β to the common factor are independently distributed in the investment opportunity set.7 We also assume that they are
normally distributed, with θ ∼ N (µθ , σθ2 ) and β ∼ N (µβ , σβ2 ). The expected return of feasible
projects in the investment opportunity set has a mean of 3%, and a standard deviation of
2%. Parameter σβ measures the heterogeneity of the investment risk profiles in the economy.
If all projects would have the same beta, they should all be optimally evaluated with a single
7

Because of the optimal selection process, they will be positively correlated within the family of implemented
projects.
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parameter
γ
δ
1/η
µθ
σθ
µβ
σβ
p
µbau
σbau
µcat
σcat

value
3
0.99
2
1.03
0.02
1
0.5
1.7%
0
0.04
-0.40
0.40

description
relative risk aversion
utility discount factor
investment capacity per project
mean expected payoff per unit of capital
standard deviation of expected payoff per unit of capital
mean payoff sensitivity to the common factor
standard deviation of payoff sensitivity to the common factor
annual probability of a macroeconomic catastrophe
technical parameter of the common factor
technical parameter of the common factor
technical parameter of the common factor
technical parameter of the common factor
Table 1: Benchmark calibration of the model.

discount rate. There would be no inefficiency associated with the WACC and Arrow-Lind
fallacies in that case. We conjecture that the welfare loss of using a single discount rate is
increasing in the standard deviation of β. We take σβ = 0.5, and we will check ex post that
this degree of heterogeneity is aligned with the distribution of sectoral CCAPM betas in the
U.S. economy.
In order to solve the classical asset pricing puzzles that prevail in the standard CCAPM,
we use the Barro’s approach based on the possibility of macroeconomic catastrophes (Barro
(2006), Martin (2013)). We assume that the common factor y is distributed as random
variable exp(Y ) − E exp(Y ) with




2
2
Y ∼ N (µbau , σbau
), 1 − p; N (µcat , σcat
), p .

(19)

With probability 1 − p, the state is business-as-usual (bau) and the distribution of Y conditional to that state is normal with mean µbau and volatility σbau . But with a small probability
p, the catastrophic state occurs, and the distribution of Y conditional to that state is normal
with mean µcat << 0 and volatility σcat .
I estimate the rational equilibrium described in Proposition 1 numerically. Because R∗ and
∗
∗
π ∗ depend upon the triplet (α∗ , θ , β ) that is determined by the optimal investment strategy
α∗ (., .), this proposition describes the optimal solution only implicitly. I solve this problem by
∗
∗
observing that this optimal strategy is a function of pair (R∗ , π ∗ ), so are θ (R∗ , π ∗ ), β (R∗ , π ∗ )
and α∗ (R∗ , π ∗ ), using respectively equations (4), (5) and (6). Thus, equations (12) and (13)
can be interpreted as a system of two equations with two unknowns, R∗ and π ∗ that I solve
numerically.
The rational investment strategy and its implication in terms of risk, return and intertemporal welfare are described in Table 2. The risk-free discount rate and the aggregate
risk premium are respectively equal to 0.86% and 2.22%, which are close to their historical
averages over the last century in the United States. Wealth and consumption grow at a trend
of 1.51%, with a volatility of 2.76%, in line with the observation. In case of a macroeconomic
catastrophe, consumption drops in expectation by almost 20%, which is representative of
10
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variable
r ∗ = R∗ − 1
π∗
α∗
1 − (α∗ /η)
∗
(θ /α∗ ) − 1
∗
β /α∗
∗
(θ /η) − 1
∗
β σy /η
cpe∗

value
0.86%
2.22%
48.60%
2.80%
4.43%
0.80
1.51%
2.76%
0.0464

description
risk-free discount rate
risk premium
proportion of projects implemented
consumption/wealth ratio
average expected return of implemented projects
average sensitivity to the common factor of the implemented projects
expected growth of consumption
volatility of consumption growth
permanent equivalent consumption

Table 2: Description of the rational equilibrium under the benchmark calibration.

the macro catastrophes documented in Barro (2006). Given the optimal discounting system,
48.60% of the investment projects pass the test of a positive NPV. Because each implemented project requires two units of wealth (η = 1/2), 97.20% of total wealth is reinvested
every period, yielding a consumption-wealth ratio of 2.80%.
The rational selection of projects allows for both an increase in the mean expected return
and a reduction in the mean sensitivity of the selected projects compared to their distribution
in the opportunity set. The mean sensitivity is 1 in the opportunity set, and is only 0.80
among implemented projects. The mean expected return is 3% in the opportunity set, and it
increases to 4.43% among implemented projects. It yields a price-earning ratio of 22.57. The
intertemporal welfare obtained from following this optimal investment strategy is equivalent
to consuming a constant flow of 4.64% of initial wealth z0 .
I now come back to the degree of heterogeneity in the risk profile of implemented projects
in the economy. The key parameter is σβ which is equal to 0.5 in this calibration. It
yields a distribution of sensitivity β to the common factor y of the implemented projects
that is determined by the optimality condition θ ≥ R∗ + βπ ∗ . One can translate this into a
distribution for the CCAPM betas of these projects by using equation (17). This distribution
is described by the smooth curve in Figure 1. These CCAPM betas have a mean of 1.03 and
and a standard deviation of 0.59. We compare this distribution to the empirical distribution
of CCAPM betas in the US stock market. To do this, we use the Fama-French dataset
of annual value-weighted returns of 49 industries over the period 1930-2018. The list of
estimated CCAPM betas for these 49 industries is given in Table 6. The distribution of
these betas is summarized in Figure 1. Its support goes from -0.25 (precious metals) to
2.35 (printing and publishing), with a mean of 1.02 and a standard deviation of 0.63. The
relative concordance of the distribution of the CCAPM betas predicted by the model with
this empirical distribution provides an additional support to this calibration exercise.

11
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021

13

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1322 [2021]

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

1

2

3

βCCAPM

Figure 1: Histogram of the OLS estimators of the CCAPM betas of the 49 Fama-French
industries of the US economy, based on industry-specific value-weighted equity returns (Table
6). Its standard deviation equals 0.63. The smooth curve describes the density function of
the distribution of the CCAPM betas of the implemented project predicted by the model.
The standard deviation of these CCAPM betas predicted by the model is 0.59. The dashed
curve is the density function N (µβ , σβ2 ) of the betas of the projects in the opportunity set.

5

The individual welfare cost of the WACC and Arrow-Lind
fallacies in the rational equilibrium

In this section, I consider the case of an irrational agent who uses a single discount rate to
determine his dynamic investment strategy. All other agents behave optimally as described
in the previous section. Therefore, the existence of this marginal agent has no effect on the
equilibrium. The dynamics of the economy, and therefore on equilibrium asset prices, are the
ones that have been examined in the previous section. The irrational agent uses the following
decision rule based on his single discount rate ρ:
α∗ (θ, β)



 =0

if θ ≤ ρ,
∈ [0, 1] if θ = ρ,


=1
if θ ≥ ρ.

(20)

This rule has the advantage of not requiring the irrational agent to estimate the beta of the
projects under scrutiny, but it implies an inefficient portfolio allocation. Given the ρ selected
by the agent, one can characterize his investment portfolio and his wealth and consumption
dynamics. It yields a triplet (αρ , θρ , β ρ ) similar to what has been described earlier, expect
that this triplet is now a function of ρ. Since it is assumed that θ and β are independently
distributed, the investment decision rule (20) implies that the mean beta of the implemented
projects will be equal to unity, so that β ρ equals αρ in this model. The intertemporal welfare
of this agent with initial wealth z0 and using the single discount rate ρ is denoted Vρ (z0 ). It
is defined recursively as follows:
αρ
Vρ (z) = u z 1 −
η
 





+ δEVρ

z
(θρ + β ρ y) .
η


(21)

12
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Optimal
strategy
0.86% + β × 2.22%

discount rate
risk-free rate
risk premium
% projects implemented
consumption/wealth ratio
E[return]
E[sensitivity]
E[growth]
growth volatility
cpe

0.86%
2.22%
48.60%
2.80%
4.43%
0.80
1.51%
2.76%
0.0464

WACC
strategy
0.86%+ 2.22%
= 3.08%
0.86%
2.22%
48.40%
3.20%
4.65%
1.00
1.30%
3.44%
0.0339

Arrow-Lind
strategy
0.86%
0.86%
2.22%
85.76%

1.00

Table 3: Comparisons of outcomes in an economy in which all agents use the optimal investment strategy, except one isolated agent who uses a single discount rate. In the "WACC
strategy" column, this discount rate ρ is selected to be the WACC R∗ + π ∗ of the portfolio
of investments undertaken by this agent. In the "Arrow-Lind strategy" column, the discount
rate is R∗ , yielding an infeasible solution. The "Optimal strategy" column is copy-pasted
from Table 2.

Using this decision rule implies that the intertemporal welfare of the isolated agent is equal
to Vρ (z0 ) = hρ z01−γ /(1 − γ) where hρ satisfies the following condition:
hρ =

(η − αρ )1−γ


ηρ1−γ − δE θρ + β ρ y

1−γ .

(22)

This solution is a function of the single discount rate ρ that is used by the irrational agent
As a benchmark, let us first examine the "WACC strategy" which consists in using the average
cost of capital in the economy as the all-purpose discount rate used by the irrational agent.
The agent knows that the average beta of the projects that he will implement is equal to 1.
Because all other agents behave rationally, the equilibrium asset returns are as described in
the previous section, with r∗ = 0.86% and π ∗ = 2.22%. The WACC of the irrational agent will
thus be equal to r∗ +π ∗ = 3.08%. He selects this rate as the single discount rate for investment
evaluation. In Table 3, I describe the outcome of this investment strategy and I compare
it to the optimal strategy already described in the previous section. The two investment
strategies are described in Figure 2. The irrational agent invests in approximately the same
number of projects (48.4%) than the rational agents (48.6%). However, the compositions of
the portfolio are quite different. The irrational agent undertakes too many risky projects
(those in the north-east red quadrant in Figure 2 should not be implemented), and too few
safe projects (those in the south-west red quadrant should be implemented). This yields more
uncertainty about future consumption, with a volatility of wealth and consumption growth
going up from 2.76% to 3.44% for rational investors. This is only partially compensated by
a larger expected portfolio return (4.65% up from 4.43%). The bottom line is a massive
13
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θ
1.10
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1.00

-1
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β

Figure 2: Comparison of the "optimal", the "WACC" and the "Arrow-Lind" investment strategies. We draw a sample of 10.000 projects from the joint normal distribution of (β, θ), using
the benchmark calibration described in Table 1. The ellipses are iso-density curves of this
joint distribution. The oblique and horizontal plain lines describe respectively the optimal
and WACC frontiers, with the set of implemented projects above these lines. The dashed
line corresponds to the Arrow-Lind strategy.

27% reduction in the measure of intertemporal welfare. Indeed, the permanent equivalent
consumption level cpe goes down from 0.0464 to 0.0339.
One could alternatively examine the "Arrow-Lind strategy" which would consist in using
the risk-free interest rate r∗ = 0.86% as the single discount rate. However, this discount rate
is too small to yield a feasible solution. Indeed, implementing this investment evaluation
procedure would imply that 86% of the investment projects would yield a positive NPV,
implying that the irrational agent should spend every period 172% of his wealth to invest.
In fact, the irrational agent has a very narrow interval of possible single discount rates
to choose from in order to generate a positive intertemporal welfare. More specifically, if he
chooses a single discount rate smaller than 3%, consumption would be negative, as in the
Arrow-Lind strategy. If he chooses a discount rate larger than 3.09%, early consumption is
too large and capital accumulation too small to support a positive permanent consumption
equivalent. In Figure 3, I show how the intertemporal welfare of the irrational agent is related
to the choice of the single discount rate.

14
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cpe (ρ)/cpe
fb
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0.4
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Figure 3: Ratio of the permanent equivalent consumption under a single discount rate ρ to
the first-best permanent equivalent consumption cpe
f b . Among these second-best strategies,
the optimal single discount rate is ρ1 = 3.06%.

6

The WACC equilibrium

In this section, I assume that all agents in the economy use the same single-DR strategy
(20). Contrary to the previous section, the fact that all agents follow the same inefficient
investment strategy means that the dynamics of growth and thus the equilibrium asset prices
are affected by the irrationality of the agents. The WACC equilibrium is defined as a dynamic
allocation of capital is which all individuals select their portfolio based on decision rule (20),
where ρ = ρ1 is the average cost of capital in the economy, i.e., ρ1 equals R1 + π1 . In
that economy, the risk-free interest rate and the risk premium must satisfy the following
equilibrium conditions:
(η − αρ1 )−γ
R1 =
(23)
−γ ,

δhρ1 E θρ1 + β ρ1 y
and


π1 =

−Ey θρ1 + β ρ1 y


E θρ1 + β ρ1 y

−γ

−γ .

(24)

By replacing hρ1 by its expression in (22), we can rewrite the WACC condition ρ1 = R1 + π1
as follows:
η 1−γ − δE(θρ1 + β ρ1 y)1−γ
−Ey(θρ1 + β ρ1 y)−γ
ρ1 =
+
.
(25)
δ(η − αρ1 )E(θρ1 + β ρ1 y)−γ
E(θρ1 + β ρ1 y)−γ
This equation, which is solved numerically, characterizes the WACC equilibrium. It is described in Table 4. The global WACC is equal to ρ1 = 3.06%. Notice that this single discount
rate combines a risk-free interest rate and a risk premium that are very different from the
individual WACC strategy described in the previous section in the isolated case. Indeed, under this equilibrium in which all agents behave irrationally, the equilibrium interest rate goes
down to -1.48% because of precautionary savings, and the equilibrium risk premium goes up
to 4.54% because of the larger macroeconomic uncertainty. Again, under this single discount
15
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Rational
equilibrium
discount rate

0.86% + β × 2.22%

risk-free rate
risk premium
% projects implemented
consumption/wealth ratio
E[return]
E[sensitivity]
E[growth]
growth volatility
cpe

0.86%
2.22%
48.60%
2.80%
4.43%
0.80
1.51%
2.76%
0.0464

WACC
equilibrium
-1.48%+ 4.54%
= 3.06%
-1.48%
4.54%
48.70%
2.52%
4.64%
1.00
2.00%
3.46%
0.0396

Table 4: Comparisons of outcomes of the rational equilibrium and the WACC equilibrium.

rate rule, the decision-maker overinvests in risky projects and underinvests in relatively safer
ones. This absence of selectivity on the risk dimension implies that the average beta is equal
to 1.00, to be compared to only 0.80 under the equilibrium with rational agents. The good
news is that the average expected return equals 4.64% under the second-best strategy, to be
compared to only 4.43% under the first best. Also, people invest a larger fraction of their
wealth in projects, so that the consumption-wealth ratio is reduced from 2.80% to 2.52%.
This is due to a precautionary effect, since the volatility of consumption growth is markedly
increased from 2.76% to 3.46%. The bottom line is again an important deterioration of intertemporal welfare. The permanent equivalent consumption drops from 0.0464 to 0.0396,
a permanent 15% reduction in consumption. Notice that the small difference between the
single discount rate used in the individual WACC solution and in the WACC equilibrium
implies a sizeable effect on welfare. This is because the marginally smaller discount rate in
the isolated case marginally increases the saving rate. But because the consumption-wealth
ratio is small, this has a sizeable effect to reduce the consumption rate, yielding an important
impact on intertemporal welfare.
It is useful to search for the single discount rate that maximizes the intertemporal welfare
of irrational agents that use a single-DR strategy. In other words, what is the ρ that maximizes
Vρ (z0 ) = hρ u(z0 )? The answer to this question is obtained by using equation (22). It is easy
to check that the first-order condition to this problem is given by equation (25). In short, the
equilibrium WACC ρ1 = 3.06% is the single discount rate that corresponds to the maximum
in Figure 3. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose that all agents in the economy use the same single-discount-rate rule
to determine their investment strategy. The single discount rate that minimizes the welfare
cost of this irrational behavior is the equilibrium WACC ρ1 = R1 +π1 , in which R1 and π1 are
respectively the equilibrium interest rate and the equilibrium risk premium in this economy.
Of course, the WACC equilibrium is dominated by the rational equilibrium, but if all
agents in the economy apply the same single discount rate rule, using the equilibrium WACC
16
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as the all-purpose discount rate is the rule that maximizes intertemporal welfare in the set
of single-discount-rate allocations.

7

The rationed Arrow-Lind equilibrium

In this section, I examine an economy in which all agents believe in the fallacious interpretation of the Arrow-Lind theorem consisting in using the equilibrium interest rate as the
all-purpose discount rate to evaluate investment projects. As we know from the previous two
sections, the equilibrium interest rate is typically too small to be use as a single discount
rate, so that the capital necessary to finance all investment projects that pass the test of a
positive NPV is larger than aggregate wealth. No equilibrium exists under this approach. In
practice, experts who have been using the Ramsey rule to estimate the public discount rate
often addressed the excess demand for public funds that this solution generated by proposing
a capital rationing scheme.8 In practice, the inability to fund all positive-NPV projects under a too low public discount rate has offered discretion to politicians and high-ranked public
servants to prioritize public investments.
I hereafter characterize a family of rationed Arrow-Lind equilibria. Such equilibria are
parametrized by a scalar q which denotes the probability for a project with a positive NPV
to be implemented. The fact that q is less than 1 means that capital is rationed in the
economy. So, an Arrow-Lind equilibrium with rationing q is defined by the fact that all
agents use the equilibrium interest rate in the economy as a all-purpose discount rate, but
only a proportion q of non-negative-NPV projects are actually implemented. The equilibrium
Arrow-Lind discount rate ρAL (q) must thus satisfy the following equilibrium condition:
 1−γ

ρAL (q) =

η
q

− δE(θ + βy)1−γ

δ( ηq − α)E(θ + βy)−γ

= R.

(26)

I describe in Table 5 two rationed AL equilibria, respectively with rationing ratio q = 0.6
and q = 0.8. Of course, it is inefficient to randomize the access to capital for good projects to
compensate for a single discount rate that is too small. This implies for example that when
we allow only q = 60% of the non-negative-NPV projects to be implemented, the permanent
equivalent consumption level is limited to 0.0253, a catastrophic 45% permanent reduction
in consumption compared to the rational strategy. The risk-free interest rate in this economy
(and thus the single discount rate) is equal to 1.18%. The demand for capital is 63.6% larger
than total wealth in the economy, but only 60% of the demand is satisfied, which leaves
1.84% of wealth for consumption. Financial risk and economic growth are highly volatile in
this economy.
8

This is illustrated for example by the last report in France that recommended a single discount rate, where
the Ramsey rule was used, combined with a public capital rationing scheme (Lebègue (2005), pp. 72-76).
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Rational
equilibrium
discount rate
risk-free rate
risk premium
% projects implemented
consumption/wealth ratio
E[return]
E[sensitivity]
E[growth]
growth volatility
cpe

0.86% + β × 2.22%
0.86%
2.22%
48.60%
2.80%
4.43%
0.80
1.51%
2.76%
0.0464

Rationed Arrow-Lind
equilibrium
q = 0.8
q = 0.6
2.44%
1.18%
2.44%
1.18%
4.61%
4.73%
48.88%
49.08%
2.24%
1.84%
4.25%
3.65%
1.00
1.00
2.74%
6.96%
4.34%
5.81%
0.0339
0.0253

Table 5: Description of two rationed Arrow-Lind equilibria. Parameter q is the proportion
of non-negative-NPV projects that are implemented.

equity premium :
standard deviation of stock returns :
concavity parameter :
rate of impatience :
risk-free rate :

8

µ − r = 0.06;
σ = 0.165;
γ = 2.2;
ρ = 0.037;
r = 0.01.

Concluding remarks

One of the most puzzling feature of the experts’ debate on the public discount rate is its reliance on its misleading cornerstone, the Ramsey rule. This rule, adjusted for the uncertainty
affecting economic growth, provides the right basis to estimate the rate at which risk-free
benefits and costs should be discounted. Using that rule to recommend an all-purpose discount rate in the economy does not only represent a very dangerous interpretation of the
theory, as explained in this paper. It also makes it impossible to initiate a constructive debate about how to value the future. As long as one ignores the necessity to adjust discount
rates to risk characteristics, all sorts of difficulties materialize, from the WACC fallacy to the
rationing of public investments with a positive NPV. Over the last ten years, the remarkable
stalemate prevailing in the Stern/Nordhaus debate on the social cost of carbon is another
vivid illustration of our collective inability to transform our consensual asset pricing theory
into practical evaluation rules. The impossibility for the U.S. administration to revise its
deeply flawed discounting system is a puzzle, in particular given the effort of some prominent
experts to change that system (Arrow et al. (2013), Lucas (2014), Sunstein (2014)). The
social cost of this failure is huge, and the credibility of our profession is at stake given the
ability of lobbies and politicians to play with the current inefficient rules. In the U.S., this
18
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means updating Circular A-4.
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Table 6 of the consumption betas using sectoral equity returns

CCAPM beta
0.36
0.44
0.43
0.74
-0.09
1.27
1.91
2.35
0.97
0.68
0.02
1.15
0.26
0.63
1.19
1.15
0.65
1.70
1.41
0.42
1.61
1.68
1.22
1.01
1.10
0.21
-0.25
1.01
1.04
1.07
0.64
0.84
2.23
1.03
1.00
-0.10

Fama-French Industry
Agriculture
Food Products
Candy & Soda
Beer & Liquor
Tobacco Products
Recreation
Entertainment
Printing and Publishing
Consumer Goods
Apparel
Healthcare
Medical Equipment
Pharmaceutical Products
Chemicals
Rubber and Plastic Products
Textiles
Construction Materials
Construction
Steel Works Etc
Fabricated Products
Machinery
Electrical Equipment
Automobiles and Trucks
Aircraft
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment
Defense
Precious Metals
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining
Coal
Petroleum and Natural Gas
Utilities
Communication
Personal Services
Business Services
Computers
Software

23
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2021

25

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1322 [2021]

2.20
0.97
1.55
0.36
1.44
1.74
0.72
1.57
0.90
1.21
2.15
1.63
0.58

Electronic Equipment
Measuring and Control Equipment
Business Supplies
Shipping Containers
Transportation
Wholesale
Retail
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels
Banking
Insurance
Real Estate
Trading
Almost Nothing

Table 6: Estimation of the CCAPM betas of the 49 Fama-French industries of the US economy. The CCAPM beta of an industry is the OLS estimator of the regression of the industryspecific value-weighted return on the growth rate of real GDP/cap, using annual data from
1930 to 2018. Source: Own computations using the Fama-French database.
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